✦ Executive Abstract
Modern AI agent platforms routinely ingest community skills and third-party prompts directly into developer and production environments. This case study demonstrates Aetherion's Zero-Trust Ingestion Sandbox in a live-fire evaluation of an external agent capability depot (117 files). While free of deliberate malware and prompt injections, static AST inspection intercepted 2 unconstrained dynamic execution primitives (exec() and verbatim shell=True) and 12 unauthorized public webhook egress routes before code could reach any active enclave.
1. The Third-Party Agent Supply Chain Gap
As autonomous agent orchestration matures, developers frequently download community skills from public repositories. Unlike compiled binaries subject to SBOM signing, agent instructions often mix markdown steering rules with dynamic execution scripts, creating latent security hazards in defense and healthcare enclaves.
2. Ephemeral Sandbox Architecture
Aetherion mandates that external assets are ingested exclusively into ephemeral, host-isolated scratch directories. Multi-vector AST scanners inspect code structures before worktree creation, verifying NIST SP 800-218 SSDF v1.2 controls (PW.4, PW.8) and preserving CMMC 2.0 Level 2 enclave boundaries.